

workmen were never terminated by the respondent and they had actually been transferred to their sister concern without altering their service conditions but this controversy was never referred to this Court by the appropriate Government, because the terms of references are confined to the justifiability or otherwise of the alleged order of termination, which were never passed by the respondent. In that behalf, reference can be made to 1984 II LLN 297 *Sita Ram Vishnu Shirodhkar and Administrator, Government of Goa and others*. In the Bombay authority referred to above, the management took up the plea of abandonment but the terms of references were confined to the justifiability of otherwise of the order of termination and in that situation, their Lordships held that since the controversy referred was absolutely alien to the actual controversy before the Court, the Labour Court or Tribunal cannot travel beyond the terms of reference and in that situation reference was held to be bad in law. Similar observations were made in 1985 Lab. I.C. 480, *Rajasthan State Transport Corporation and others v. The Judge, Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur and others*. In this authority his Lordship held that the powers of the Labour Court are circumscribed by the terms of reference and the Labour Court cannot travel beyond the parameters of the same. On this ground also, these references must fail, which are held to be bad in law and as such, the workmen are not entitled to any relief. References are answered and returned accordingly with no orders as to cost. Copy of this award be placed upon files of references numbers 134 to 136 and 138 to 143 all of the year 1984.

Dated 11th November, 1985.

B. P. JINDAL,
Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Rohtak.

Endorsement No. 133-136-138-143/84/1919, dated 11th December, 1985.

Forwarded (four copies), to the Secretary to Government, Haryana, Labour and Employment Departments, Chandigarh, as required under section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

B. P. JINDAL,
Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Rohtak.

No. 9/5/84-6 Lab./10936.—In pursuance of the provisions of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act No. XIV of 1947) the Governor of Haryana is pleased to published the following award of Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rohtak, in respect of the dispute between the Workman and the management of The State Transport Controller, Haryana, Chandigarh.

BEFORE SHRI B. P. JINDAL, PRESIDING
OFFICER, LABOUR COURT,
ROHTAK.

Reference No. 106 of 1982.

between

SHRI RAJINDER KUMAR GOEL, WORKMAN
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF M/S. STATE
TRANSPORT CONTROLLER, HARYANA,
CHANDIGARH.

Present:

Shri S. S. Gupta, A.R., for the workman.
Shri V. K. Kohli, A.R., for the management.

AWARD

1. In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Governor of Haryana, referred the following dispute, between the workman Shri Rajinder Kumar Goel and management of M/s. State Transport Controller, Haryana, Chandigarh, to this Court, for adjudication,—vide Labour Department, Gazette Notification No. ID/HSR/12/82/24743, dated 1st June, 1982:—

Whether the termination of service of Shri Rajinder Kumar Goel was justified and in order? If not, to what relief is he entitled?

2. On receipt of the order of reference, notices were issued to the parties. The parties appeared. The case of the workman is that he was employed initially for a period of one year as a Apprentice Clerk from 5th July, 1977 to 4th July, 1978, but remained in continuous employment of the respondent upto 9th November, 1981, on which date his services were terminated on the ground that the same were no longer required and that the said order is unlawful and illegal and the same was passed in flagrant disregard of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

3. In the reply filed by the respondent, the claim of the workman has been controverted in

parts. It is admitted that the workman was employed as alleged but it is asserted that he was employed on *ad hoc* basis with effect from 21st June, 1979 and posted in Haryana Roadways, Sirsa Depot for a period of six months and till the arrival of regular candidates from the Subordinate Services Selection Board and his termination was in accordance with the terms and conditions of the appointment letter. In the amended written reply filed by the management, preliminary objection taken was that this Court has no jurisdiction to try the present reference, because the petitioner and many others had filed Writ Petition No. 3867 of 1980, which was dismissed on 5th December, 1980.

4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issue was settled for decision on 8th February, 1983:—

1. Whether the termination of services of Shri Rajinder Kumar Goel was justified and in order? If not, to what relief is he entitled?

5. In pursuance of the amended reply filed by the respondent, the following additional issue was laid down for decision by me on 24th September, 1984:—

- 1-A. Whether the reference is bad in law in view of the preliminary objection taken in the written statement dated nil.

6. Both the parties were allowed to produce their evidence. The respondent examined MW-1 Shri Zile Singh, clerk and also tendered into evidence a copy of the judgement passed in Civil Writ Petition referred to above Ex. M-X. On the other hand the workman appeared as WW-1.

7. Heard.

8. On behalf of the respondent Shri Kohli learned Law Officer contended that since the appointment of the petitioner was purely on *ad hoc* basis and there was another condition incorporated in the appointment letter issued to the petitioner that his appointment is for a period of six months or till the arrival of candidates approved by the Subordinate Services Selection Board and so also, termination of services of the petitioner cannot be held to be illegal. This contention has no force. If the appointment of the petitioner was for a period of six months only, why the same was extended for more than four years. The respondent has placed on record Ex.

M-1 a copy of the appointment letter and Ex. M-2 a copy of the order of termination. Even in the order of termination there is no mention that candidates approved by the Subordinate Services Selection Board are to be appointed and so the services of the petitioner are being terminated. The order of termination is absolutely innocuous. The same reads as under:—

“The services of Shri Rajinder Kumar Goel, Clerk, Haryana Roadways, Sirsa are discontinued being no longer required with immediate effect.”

9. So, the termination of the petitioner was simpliciter retrenchment, which could not have been done by the respondent without complying of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

10. Faced with this situation, the learned Law Officer of the respondent contended that the petitioner and many others had filed Writ petition in the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana bearing number 3868 of 1980, copy of which is Ex. MX, which was dismissed by the Hon'ble High Court,—*vide* its judgement referred to above on 1st September, 1981. I have gone through the judgement of the Hon'ble judges passed in the said petition. The prayer of the petitioner was that the services cannot be terminated by the respondent on the pretext that candidates duly selected by the Subordinate Services Selection Board are to be accommodated and that their services be regularised. Many other pleas were taken, but those are not relevant for the disposal of the controversy in hand. In my opinion, the order passed in the Writ Petition cannot come to the rescue of the respondent, because before their Lordships the controversy was absolutely different. As yet no order of termination has been passed against the petitioner. So, there was no question of their Lordships deciding as to whether order of termination passed against the petitioner was legal and lawful. Under these circumstances, there is no difficulty in holding that the order of termination passed against the petitioner was in flagrant disregard of the mandatory provisions of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and before passing the same no prior notice or retrenchment compensation was paid to the petitioner, though the petitioner remained continuously employed with the respondent for more than four years. Under these circumstances, order passed cannot be sustained and as such, the same is set aside and in the process the workman is ordered to be reinstated with all benefits of previous service.

On the question of back wages also, the petitioner cannot fail, because he raised the demand notice received by this Court alongwith the order of reference within less than one month of his termination. The reference is answered and returned accordingly with no orders as to cost.

Dated the, 15th November, 1985.

B. P. JINDAL,
Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Rohtak.

Endorsement No. 106/82/1920, dated the
11th December, 1985

Forwarded (four copies) to the Secretary to Government, Haryana, Labour and Employment Departments, Chandigarh as required under section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

B. P. JINDAL,
Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Rohtak.

No. 9/5/84-Lab./10937.—In pursuance of the provisions of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act No. XIV of 1947) the Governor of Haryana is pleased to publish the following award of Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rohtak, in respect of the dispute between the Workman and the management of M/s Sooraj Steel Industries Ltd., Industrial Area, Sonapat.

BEFORE SHRI B. P. JINDAL, PRESIDING
OFFICER, LABOUR COURT,
ROHTAK.

Reference No. 114 of 1984.

between

SHRI JAI BHAGWAN, WORKMAN AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF M/S. SOORAJ STEEL
INDUSTRIES LTD., INDUSTRIAL AREA,
SONEPAT.

Present:

Shri R. S. Lakra, A.R., for the workman.

Shri D. C. Gandhi, A.R., for the management.

AWARD

1. In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Governor of Haryana, referred the following dispute, between the workman Shri Jai Bhagwan and the management of M/s. Sooraj Steel Industries Ltd., Industrial Area, Sonapat, to this Court, for adjudication,—vide Haryana Government Gazette Notification No. 24639—44, dated 13th July, 1984:—

Whether the termination of services of Shri Jai Bhagwan is justified and in order?
If not, to what relief is he entitled?

2. After receipt of the order of reference notices were issued to the parties. The parties appeared. The case of the workman is that he was employed with the respondent since 29th December, 1973 as a Electrician, on monthly wages of Rs. 570/- and that the management choose to terminate his services unlawfully on 4th December, 1983, on some trumped up charges, which were never probed and as such, he has prayed for reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages.

3. In the reply filed by the respondent, preliminary objection taken is that the reference is bad in law, because services of the workman were never terminated, dismissed or that he was never retrenched from employment. It is overruled that the petitioner lost lien on his job by remaining absent from duty for more than ten consecutive days without any prior intimation or permission from the respondent.

4. On merits, reply runs on the same line and as such, I need not suffer repetition.

5. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issue was settled for decision by me on 14th December, 1984:—

1. Whether the termination of services of Shri Jai Bhagwan is justified and in order? If not, to what relief is he entitled?

6. In support of his claim, the workman appeared as WW-1 and the respondent examined MW-1 Shri Rajbir its Time Keeper.

7. Heard.

8. Though there is an error in the date of termination in the Claim Statement filed in the Court by the workman, because in the same the date of termination has been given as 4th December, 1984, but in the demand notice dated 6th December, 1983, the date of termination mentioned is 4th December, 1983. Assuming that date was 4th December, 1983, the clear case of the management is that services of the workman were never terminated as alleged and that he of his own abandoned his employment by remaining absent from duty without prior intimation for ten consecutive days. In that behalf, the management has placed on record Ex. M-1 a photo copy of the roll of the workman, Ex. M-2 a notice given to the workman regarding his absence from duty. Ex. M-4 is the copy of the Certified Standing Orders applicable upon the respondent. The management has also alleged that on 19th April, 1984, the workman of his own came and collected his dues. Payment of voucher

in that behalf is Ex M-5. The same is attested by Shri R. S. Lakra, Authorised Representative of the workman. On behalf of the workman Shri Lakra contended that—*vide* Ex. M-5 the workman received his wages dues and not that he has fully and finally settled his accounts with the respondent. Be that it may so, the case of the respondent has been that the petitioner abandoned his employment of his own by remaining absent from duty, but the terms of reference are regarding the justifiability or otherwise of the alleged termination of the workman. So, the terms of reference are absolutely alien to the real controversy before the Court, which has been unfolded during the trial. The Labour Court or Tribunal can adjudicate upon the matters incidental or ancillary to the terms of reference but it cannot travel beyond the same and adjudicate upon the matters which are not within four parameters of the same. I am fortified in my observations from the law laid down in 1984 II LLN 297 *Sita Ram Vishnu Shirodhkar and Administrator Government of Goa and others*. In that case also, the management simply took the plea of abandonment and their lordships of the Bombay High Court held that since the controversy in hand was absolutely alien to the terms of reference, so, the reference is bad in law and another authority on the point which can be referred with advantage is 1985 Lab. I.C. 480, *Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others versus The Judge, Industrial Tribunal Rajasthan, Jaipur and others*. So, there is no difficulty in holding that the present reference is bad in law and answered accordingly with no orders as to cost.

Dated the, 11th November, 1985.

B. P. JINDAL,
Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Rohtak.

Endorsement No. 114-84/1921, dated the
11th December, 1985

Forwarded (four copies) to the Secretary to Government, Haryana, Labour and Employment Departments, Chandigarh as required under section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

B. P. JINDAL,
Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Rohtak.

No. 9/5/84-6 Lab./10938.—In pursuance of the provisions of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act No. XIV of 1947) the Governor of Haryana is pleased to publish the following award of Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rohtak, in respect of the dispute between the Workman and the management of M/s. Branch Manager, Haryana Financial Corporation, Plot No. 8, Adal New Mandi, Dabwali Road, Sirsa.

BEFORE SHRI B. P. JINDAL, PRESIDING
OFFICER, LABOUR COURT,
ROHTAK.

Reference No. 73 of 1984.

between

SHRI SUBHASH CHANDER, WORKMAN AND
THE MANAGEMENT OF M/S. BRANCH
MANAGER, HARYANA FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, PLOT NO.-8, ADAL
NEW MANDI, DABWALI ROAD,
SIRSA.

Present:

Shri H. S. Smaug, A.R., for the workman.
Shri S. S. Goyal, A.R., for the respondent.

AWARD

1. In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Governor of Haryana, referred the following dispute, between the workman Shri Subhash Chander and the management of M/s. Branch Manager, Haryana Financial Corporation, Plot No. 8, Adal New Mandi, Dabwali Road, Sirsa, to this Court, for adjudication,—*vide* Labour Department Gazette Notification No. 18250-54, dated 10th May, 1984:—

Whether the termination of services of Shri Subhash Chander is justified and and in order? If not, to what relief is he entitled?

2. After receipt of the order of reference, notices were issued to the parties. The parties appeared. The case of the workman is that he was employed with the respondent as a Peon on monthly wages of Rs. 350 on 28th July, 1982, but the respondent choose to terminate his services unlawfully on 6th September, 1983, though he had put on more than 350 days of actual work with the respondent and that the order of termination is illegal and unlawful, because the same was passed in gross violation of the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. *Inter alia*, he has alleged that his services were terminated out of malice and revenge.

3. In the reply filed by the respondent, it is alleged that the petitioner was never continuously employed with the respondent as alleged, because he was initially appointed purely on *ad hoc* basis on 28th July, 1982, and his services were terminated on 21st October, 1982, similarly he was again employed on purely *ad hoc* basis for the periods mentioned below:—

25th October, 1982 to 24th January, 1983.

27th January, 1983 to 26th April, 1983.

28th April, 1983 to 27th July, 1983.

4. It is further alleged that the petitioner was again employed on daily wages with effect from 5th August, 1983 to 5th September, 1983, on which date, his services were terminated, because of unsatisfactory work and conduct. It is further alleged that services of the workman were terminated in accordance with the terms of conditions given in the letter of appointment.

5. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issue was settled for decision by me on 27th September, 1984:—

1. Whether the termination of services of Shri Subhash Chander is justified and in order? If not, to what relief is he entitled?

6. The petitioner himself appeared as WW-1 and the management examined MW-1 Shri S. K. Agarwal, its Branch Manager at Sirsa.

7. Authorised Representatives of the parties heard.

8. Employment of the petitioner as alleged in his claim statement is not denied by the respondent, though the respondent has alleged that a short break was given in his employment after every three months. The learned Authorised Representative of the respondent Shri Goyal forcefully contended that the case of the petitioner falls within the purview of exceptions appended to section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, because the petitioner was appointed for fixed tenure on purely *ad hoc* basis and after expiry of the fixed tenure, the petitioner has no right to remain in employment. In that behalf, he has drawn my attention to the various letters of appointment, applications of the petitioner for *denovo* appointment and orders of termination passed after expiry of the fixed tenure. The same are Ex-M-1 to M-18. In my opinion, contention put forth on behalf of the respondent is well founded. The case between Santosh Gupta and the State Bank of India reported in 1980 II LLJ page 72 would have come to the rescue of the petitioner, in case, there would have been only breaks in the employment of the petitioner.

Here beside breaks given, every time the petitioner was employed *denovo*, the petitioner applied for appointment and an order of appointment was passed and thereafter an order of terminating the services of the petitioner was also passed. So, that would mean that the appointment of the petitioner was for a fixed tenure and as such, his case is covered under exception (bb) appended to the section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, had the petitioner not applied for *denovo* appointment after expiry of the fixed tenure and the respondent had chosen to extend his terms of appointment *suo-moto*, the case would have been different. Unfortunately in this case petitioner choose to file applications for re-employment after expiry of his fixed tenure of employment. Under these circumstances, provisions of section 25F are not attracted in this case and as such, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The reference is answered and returned accordingly with no order as to cost. Dated the, 6th November, 1985.

B. P. JINDAL,
Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Rohtak.
Camp Court, Bahadurgarh.

Endorsement No. 73-84/1922, dated the
11th December, 1985.

Forwarded (four copies) to the Secretary to Government Haryana, Labour and Employment Departments, Chandigarh, as required under section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

B. P. JINDAL,
Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Rohtak,
Camp Court, Bahadurgarh.

The 22nd January, 1986

No. 9/7/86-6Lab./161.—In pursuance of the provisions of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act No. XIV of 1947), the Governor of Haryana is pleased to publish the following award of Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rohtak, in respect of the dispute between the workman and the management of Haryana State Society Advisory Board, Chandigarh.

BEFORE SHRI B. P. JINDAL,
PRESIDING OFFICER,
LABOUR COURT, ROHTAK
Reference No. 195 of 82
between

SHRI BALJIT SINGH DAHIYA, WORKMAN
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF HARYANA
STATE SOCIAL ADVISORY BOARD,
CHANDIGARH

Present:

Shri S. S. Gupta, Authorised Representative for the workman.

Shri Rishi Parkash, Authorised Representative for the management.

AWARD

1. In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Governor of Haryana referred the following dispute between the workman Shri Baljit Singh and the management of Haryana State Social Advisory Board, Chandigarh, to this Court, for adjudication,—vide Haryana Government Gazette Notification No. ID/CHD/17/82/46132, dated 7th October, 1982:—

Whether the termination of service of Shri Baljit Singh Dahiya was justified and in order. If not, to what relief is he entitled ?

2. After receipt of the order of reference, notices were issued to the parties. The parties appeared. The case of the petitioner is that he was employed with the respondent as an Accountant since the year 1972 and all through his work and conduct has been satisfactory, for which he was confirmed on 30th June, 1972, but the respondent choose to terminate his services unlawfully, with effect from 27th June, 1979 and the said order of termination was passed in flagrant disregard of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, *Inter alia* it is alleged that the persons junior to the applicant have been retained in employment by the management.

3. In the reply filed by the respondent, preliminary objections taken are that the present reference is not maintainable as the petitioner is not a workman as defined in section 2(S) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and that the controversy in hand has already been gone into by the competent Court where the petitioner has failed to get any relief and that the reference is barred by limitation. On merits, it is admitted that the applicant was employed in the year 1972, but it is denied that he was never confirmed and that his posting was purely on temporary basis and that his services were

terminated in accordance with the provisions of law.

4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for decision on 14th May, 1983:—

(1) Whether the applicant is a workman? OPA.

(2) Whether the present petition is barred by the principles of *resjudicata* ? OPR.

(3) Whether the termination of service of Shri Baljit Singh Dahiya was justified and in order ? If not, to what relief is he entitled ?

5. Authorised Representatives of the parties heard. My findings on the issues framed are as below :—

ISSUE NO. 1:

6. In a half hearted manner the learned Authorised Representative of the respondent contended that since the petitioner was employed as an Accountant and was supervising the work and conduct of six Bal Sewikas and he was performing the duties of supervising nature and as such, his case falls within the ambit of exceptions appended to section 2(S) of the said Act. Section 2(S) defines the term workman. In my opinion, the contention is mis-leading, because the only witness examined by the respondent Shri A. R. Uppal, Secretary of the respondent board categorically stated that the petitioner was performing the duties of clerical nature. He stated that no power of recruitment, dismissal, sanction of leave or taking and disciplinary action against any subordinate vested in the petitioner. So, simply because the petitioner was supervising the working of Bal Sewikas would not take him out of the ambit of the term 'workman' as defined in section 2(S) of the said Act. So, the petitioner is held to be a "Workman" under the said Act and as such, this issue goes against the respondent.

ISSUE NO. 2:

7. Admittedly the petitioner filed a civil suit challenging his termination in the Civil Court. His suit was dismissed and an appeal filed by him with the learned Additional District Judge, Rohtak also failed. Copy of the judgement is, Exhibit M-3. He failed because the learned Court held that the discretionary relief

of declaration cannot be granted to the petitioner under the Civil Law. So, there is no question of judgement operating as *resjudicata*.

ISSUE NO. 3:

8. There is no limitation prescribed in the Indian Limitations Act for raising a demand notice or making a reference by the Government to a Labour Court. The question of delay in raising the demand notice can be gone into by the Court while considering the question of back wages, in case, the workman is ordered to be reinstated. So, on the plea of limitations also the respondent cannot succeed.

ISSUE NO. 4:

9. The services of the petitioner were dispensed with,—vide letter copy of which is Exhibit M-2. It is stated therein that the services of the petitioner are no longer required and he stands relieved with immediate effect. The said letter is, dated 27th June, 1979. It is ordered that the petitioner be paid one month salary in lieu of one month notice as per the terms and conditions in the appointment letter. The learned Authorised Representative of the respondent contended that the order of termination has been passed within four corners of the terms incorporated in the letter of appointment and as such, the petitioner cannot challenge the same. The contention is mis-conceived. The petitioner has been held to be a workman within the term "workman" as defined in section 2(S) of the said Act. His termination falls within the definition of term 'retrenchment' as given in section 2(oo) of the said Act. So, his retrenchment could not have been brought about by the respondent without complying with the provisions of section 25F of the said Act. Compliance was not made, is not disputed by the respondent. The petitioner has definitely put in more than six years of continuous service with the respondent. There is no allegation that he has worked for less than 240 days during the last twelve calendar months from the date of his termination. So, the order of termination could not have been passed by the respondent without complying with the mandatory provisions of section 25F of the said Act. Furthermore the employees junior to the petitioner have been retained in employment by the respondent. This is admitted by MW-1 Shri A. P. Uppal, who

stated that one Balwant Singh, who was recruited as a clerk much after the petitioner is still in service. So, there is no difficulty in holding that the order of termination was passed by the respondent in flagrant disregard of the provisions of section 25F and G of the said Act and as such, the same cannot be sustained and is hereby held to be illegal and unlawful and set aside.

10. Now, the question of back wages survives for consideration. There is nothing on the file as to when Civil Suit was filed by the petitioner out of which an appeal arose, copy of the judgement of which is, Exhibit M-3. The appeal was dismissed on 7th March, 1980. Services of the petitioner were dispensed with on 27th June, 1979. As already observed there is nothing on record to prove as to when Civil Suit was filed by the petitioner. Copy of the demand notice received alongwith the order of reference is, dated 11th December, 1981. The same was raised after one year eight months of the dismissal of his appeal. There was no reason for the petitioner to have waited so long when he knew that he has failed to avail of any remedy in the Civil Suit. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is allowed back wages from 11th December, 1981 till the date of his reinstatement.

11. In the result, the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated with continuity of service and wages with all incidental benefits thereof from 11th December, 1981, till the date of reinstatement. The reference is answered and returned accordingly with no order as to cost. The 18th December, 1985.

B. P. JINDAL,
Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Rohtak,
Camp Court, Sirsa.

Endorsement No. 195-82/10, dated 2nd January, 1986.

Forwarded (four copies), to the Secretary to Government, Haryana, Labour and Employment Departments, Chandigarh, as required under section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

B. P. JINDAL,
Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Rohtak,
Camp Court, Sirsa.